This paper argues that in the presence of liquidation costs, portfolio diversification by financial institutions may be socially inefficient. We propose a stylized model in which individual banks have an incentive to hold diversified portfolios. Yet, at the same time, diversification may increase the aggregate risk faced by the banks' depositors, creating a negative externality. The increase in systemic risk is due to the fact that even though diversification decreases the probability of each bank's failure, it may increase the probability of joint failures, which may be socially inefficient when the depositors are risk-averse. The presence of such externalities suggests that financial innovations that enable banks to engineer more diversified portfolios have non-trivial welfare implications.
Introduction
The proliferation of new complex financial instruments can be considered as one of the most significant events in finance over the past two decades. According to the conventional wisdom, financial innovations in the form of credit default swaps and similar products have enabled financial institutions to diversify risk more effectively and as a result, have increased the efficiency of the system as whole. In fact, the potential benefits of such instruments served as one of most important rationales for deregulation in the decade prior to The Financial Crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] . 1 On the other hand, and more recently, it has also been argued that these instruments may have contributed to the fragility of the financial system by increasing the overlap in the portfolios of different institutions. For example, as argued by Andrew Haldane, the Executive Director of Financial Stability in the Bank of England, "diversification strategies by individual firms generated a lack of diversity across the system as a whole," leading to a financial system that exhibited "both greater complexity and less diversity," at the detriment of the system's stability (Haldane (2009, p. 8)) .
In this paper, we argue that in the presence of liquidation costs, risk diversification by financial institutions may indeed be inefficient from a social welfare point of view. We study a stylized economy consisting of two competitive banking sectors, owned by risk-neutral bankers, and a mass of risk-averse consumers, who are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks as in the canonical model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . In order to ensure themselves against these shocks, the consumers deposit their funds in the banks, who would then invest in two risky assets on their behalf in exchange for standard demand deposit contracts. The key underlying assumption of our model is that the set of assets in which the two banks can invest in are identical. We also assume that even though the final returns on the banks' investments are observable, their investment decisions are not contractable.
Given that the banks are subject to runs when the returns on their investments are below a certain level, the bankers have an incentive to choose diversified portfolios, as diversification decreases the probability of a run on each of the banks. Yet, in our model, such diversified portfolios may be socially inefficient. More diversification implies that the returns on the banks' portfolios would become more correlated, and hence, the probability of simultaneous bank runs would increase. When the depositors are risk-averse, a higher likelihood of simultaneous runs -despite a lower probability of individual runs -may lead to a sharp decrease in the depositors' expected utility. We show that it is indeed possible that the welfare loss due to joint failures outweigh the gains in reducing the probability of individual bank runs, implying an inefficient equilibrium.
In addition to the presence of (endogenous) costly liquidations, excessive equilibrium diversification in our model relies on three key ingredients. First, the presence of "over-lapping" assets in which the two banks can invest in implies that banks cannot construct diversified portfolios without increasing the correlation between their returns. Clearly, if each bank has access to a different 1 See, for example, Greenspan (1997) and Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011). set of assets with independent returns, diversification does not lead to correlated portfolios. The second ingredient is the risk-aversion of the depositors. If the depositors are risk-neutral, their incentives (as far as the extent of the diversification is concerned) would be aligned with those of the bankers. Yet, risk-aversion guarantees that, all else equal, the depositors would be worse off as the probability of simultaneous runs increases. Finally, the fact that the banks' investment decisions are not contractable implies that the bankers do not internalize the adverse effects of diversification on the depositors.
We remark that in our model, there are no externalities among the banks. Rather, it is the negative externality of the banks' decisions on the depositors that is the source of inefficiency.
In particular, with diversified portfolios, a negative return on only one of the assets may lead to simultaneous runs on both banks; an outcome that would have been avoided with no diversification. Thus, effectively, by choosing more diversified (and hence, more similar) portfolios, the banks reduce the set of contingencies in which the depositors are (at least, partially) paid above the liquidation value.
The inefficiency identified by our model suggests a potentially important role for regulatory interventions. In particular, given the banks' desire to hold overly diversified portfolios, restrictions on the sets of portfolios that different banks can hold would be socially beneficial. Alternatively, under certain conditions -and as opposed to the conventional wisdom -the banking regulator may need to discourage diversification by say, imposing higher capital requirements on banks that hold overly diversified portfolios.
On a broader level, our analysis highlights that regulatory mechanisms that focus on each bank's risk in isolation may not be sufficient for mitigating risks at a systemic level. Rather, an effective regulatory policy may need to take the endogenous correlations between different banks' portfolios into account. 2 Our results also suggest that financial innovations that enable banks to engineer more diversified portfolios, may indeed lead to lower social welfare, as the probability that several financial institutions default together during periods of financial distress may increase. This observation thus suggests that the well-known benefits of financial innovations (such as more efficient levels of risk-sharing) may be inseparable from a "curse of financial engineering" manifested in the form of higher systemic risk.
Several recent papers, such as Acharya (2009 ), Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2011 ) and Wagner (2009 , 2010 , 2011 ) study the possible adverse effects of diversification on increasing systemic risk. Like the current paper, this literature emphasizes the fact that joint failures of financial institutions may create a higher social cost compared to that of individual failures. The key common assumption in these papers is that a systemic market crash creates direct externalities between different intermediaries, leading to welfare losses. For example, Ibragimov et al. (2011) study a model in which the rationale for diversification is weakened in the presence of heavy-tailed risks and high correlations between risks within an asset class. The key assumption in their model is that joint failures of intermediaries would lead to slower recovery of the financial system, hence creating larger social costs. In contrast to this literature, no such inter-bank externalities exist in our model. Rather, the welfare loss is due to the fact that the banks do not internalize the impact of their joint investment decisions on the depositors.
Our paper is most closely related to the recent works of Wolf Wagner, who also focuses on the trade-off between diversification and the diversity of portfolios held by different intermediaries.
Wagner (2010) studies a two bank-two asset model similar to ours. The underlying assumption of his model is that in case of a single default, the insolvent bank can sell its assets to the solvent bank and avoid a physical (and more costly) liquidation. Such transfers of assets are not possible when both banks are insolvent, which makes physical liquidation of the assets unavoidable. This implies the existence of a negative externality among the banks, whereby increasing a bank's diversification level increases the possibility of costly liquidation of assets by the other. On the contrary, our model does not rely on higher costs of liquidation for the banks when a systemic failure occurs.
In two related papers, Wagner (2009 Wagner ( , 2011 explores the diversification-diversity tradeoff in the presence of pecuniary externalities. In these models, the prices at which assets are liquidated are endogenously determined and are lower when a larger number of portfolios are liquidated at the same time. Hence, the extent of diversification of a bank determines the liquidation costs of other intermediaries. Since these costs are not internalized by the banks, the equilibrium and efficient levels of diversification do not necessarily coincide. In our model, however, the liquidation costs of a bank do not depend on the portfolio or the returns of the other bank. The inefficiency arises due to the divergence of banks' profit incentives and the depositors' welfare.
Our paper is also related to Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008) , who study a model in which banks have an ex ante incentive to herd and increase the likelihood of joint failures in order to induce a bailout by the government. Somewhat relatedly, Farhi and Tirole (2012) argue that untargeted policy instruments used by a central bank during the times of financial distress, such as lowering the Fed Funds rate, would incentivize the banks to take on too much correlated risk. A different strand of literature, such as Simsek (2012) and Kubler and Schmedders (2012) , studies the potential negative implications of financial innovations on portfolio risk and asset price volatility when agents have heterogenous beliefs. Also relevant is Buffa (2012) , who develops a structural model of credit risk in which asset value dynamics are endogenously determined by optimal portfolio allocation. He shows that in the presence of systemic externalities, strategic considerations lead financial institutions to adopt polarized and stochastic risk exposures, but without sacrificing full diversification. Finally, our paper is related to the broader literature on systemic risk and financial contagion, such as Shaffer (1994) , Allen and Gale (2000) , Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) , Dasgupta (2004) , and more recently, Acharya et al. (2010) and Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012) , among others.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first present a simple reduced-form variant of the model in order to illustrate the key economic forces at play. Section 3 contains the full-fledged micro-founded model. Our main results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. All proofs and some other mathematical details can be found in the Appendices.
Reduced-Form Model
This section contains a simple reduced-form version of the model, which we use to illustrate the key economic forces at play. The complete micro-founded model is presented and analyzed in the subsequent sections.
Consider an economy consisting of two risk-neutral financial institutions (henceforth, banks for short), indexed by a and b, and a risk-averse representative consumer who has deposited a unit of endowment in each of the banks. Each bank can invest the deposits in a distinct, "nonoverlapping" set of finitely many assets with independent returns. The banks are subject to default (for example, due to a run) if the returns on their investments are below some exogenously given threshold d, in which case they make zero profits. On the other hand, if the realized return of the bank's investment is larger than d, it obtains a constant payoff of R > 0. Thus, bank i ∈ {a, b} chooses a portfolio that minimizes its default probability, p i . 3
The payoff to the representative depositor also depends on the returns of the banks' portfolios.
In particular, if the realized returns of a bank is larger than d, the depositor receives a return of c, whereas she only gets α < c in case of default. 4 Thus, the expected utility of the representative depositor can be written as
which is strictly decreasing in both p a and p b . This immediately implies that when the sets of assets in which the banks invest in do not overlap, the incentives of the banks and the depositor are fully aligned: all parties prefer investments that reduce the probability of individual defaults. In particular, if diversified portfolios decrease the probability of an individual failure, diversification is desirable both from the banks' and the social welfare points of view.
This picture, however, would be dramatically different if there is some overlap in the sets of assets that the two banks can invest in. Such overlapping investments imply that the returns on the banks' investments may no longer be independent. Clearly, the optimal portfolio from the banks' point of view remains identical to the non-overlapping assets case, as bank i still prefers investments that minimize p i . However, the representative depositor's expected utility would be equal to
The assumption that each bank can invest in only finitely many assets with independent returns implies that it cannot completely diversify the risk away. 4 In the full-fledged model presented in Section 3 we provide micro-foundations for these assumptions.
where p ab is the probability that both banks default simultaneously. The above expression suggests that the consumer's utility not only depends on the probability of individual failures, p a and p b , but also on the probability of a systemic failure in which both banks default simultaneously. Hence, even if diversification reduces the probability of individual failures (and hence, maximizing each bank's profits), the induced correlation in banks' returns may reduce the depositor's utility (by increasing p ab ) and possibly even social welfare. Yet, such an effect is not internalized by the banks, as the incentives of the banks and the depositor are no longer fully aligned. This negative externality implies that, in contrast to the non-overlapping case, in the presence of common assets the welfare implications of diversification are non-trivial.
Finally, we remark that regardless of the extent of the overlap between the two sets of assets, the expected utility of a risk-neutral depositor is equal to
which is strictly decreasing in p a and p b . Thus, when the depositor is risk-neutral, her interests are fully aligned with those of the banks, even if the sets of assets in which banks can invest in are overlapping. Under risk-neutrality, all parties only care about reducing the probability of individual failures. This is not surprising in light of the fact that the expected utility of such a depositor does not depend on the correlation between the transfers she receives from the two banks.
In the rest of the paper, we develop and analyze a micro-founded model and show that under fairly general conditions, the intuitions presented in this section carry through.
Micro-Founded Model and Equilibrium

Depositors
Consider a single-good economy that lasts for three dates t = 0, 1, 2. The economy is populated by a unit mass of depositors (also referred to as consumers) with 2 units of endowment of the good at t = 0 and no endowment at other dates. The individuals are ex ante identical, but are subject to idiosyncratic preference shocks, which affect their demand for the consumption good at future dates. In particular, the consumers have standard Diamond-Dybvig preferences: a fraction π of them are impatient (also referred to as short-lived and denoted by s) and value consumption only at t = 1, whereas the rest are patient (also referred to as long-lived and denoted by ) and value consumption at both future dates; that is,
where u(·) is continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave. Each depositor learns her type at the beginning of date t = 1, which remains a private information of the individual throughout. Finally, we assume that, except for depositing their endowments in the banks, the depositors have no means of transferring their wealth from t = 0 to future dates.
Banks
In addition to the consumers, there are two competitive banking "sectors" in the economy, indexed by a and b, whose role is to make investments on behalf of the consumers. Each bank is owned by a risk-neutral banker who maximizes expected profits. Banks in each sector have k units of endowment which they need to pay as an entry cost. The deposits of the consumers are invested by the banks in two different assets. Even though the returns on the banks' investments are observable, we assume that they are non-contractable. We also assume that each consumer deposits exactly one unit of her endowment in each bank. 5 Given that the type of the consumers and the banks' portfolio returns are non-contractable, a demand deposit contract between a bank in sector i ∈ {a, b} and the depositors is a pair c i = (c i1 , c i2 ), capturing the claim of depositors who withdraw in periods t = 1 and t = 2, respectively. In the event that a bank cannot fulfill its promise to repay all withdrawing depositors based on the face value of the demand deposit contracts, the banks' assets are liquidated and distributed equally among the withdrawing depositors.
After paying the entry cost k and raising capital from the depositors in exchange for demand deposit contracts, the banks invest in two distinct illiquid assets, indexed 1 and 2. Asset j ∈ {1, 2} has a random return of z j at period t = 1 and a fixed return of R after it matures at t = 2. The returns of the assets at t = 1 are independent and identically distributed with mean µ and a smooth probability density function f (·) which has full support over [0, ∞).
We denote the level of investment of bank i in asset 1 by γ i ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, γ i captures the extent of diversification in bank i's portfolio, with γ i = 1/2 corresponding to a fully diversified portfolio.
We assume that banks can liquidate their portfolio at t = 1, but this liquidation is costly: if assets are liquidated prematurely at t = 1, they would have a fixed return of α < R, which is a small positive number. For simplicity, throughout the paper, we focus on the limiting case that α → 0, which implies that in the case of a bank run, the bank needs to liquidate all its holdings of both assets.
Competitive Equilibrium
The strategy of a bank in sector i consists of a decision to enter, a demand deposit contract c i = (c i1 , c i2 ) offered to the depositors upon entry, and an investment decision γ i (c i ), if contract c i is accepted by the depositors. On the other hand, a depositor chooses which pair of contracts to accept and whether to withdraw its deposits at date t = 1 after observing the realization of its type and the short-term returns of the banks' portfolios. 6 We denote the expected profits of a bank in sector i as a function of the face value of the contract it offers and its investment decision -provided that it is accepted by the depositors -when the patient depositors withdraw optimally by Π i (c i , γ i ). 7 Thus, the optimal investment decision of the bank is given by
( 1) We also denote the transfer from bank i to the depositors of type θ ∈ {s, } when a contract of face value c i is accepted and the bank chooses γ i by T θ i (c i , γ i ). 8 Therefore, the expected utility of the depositors when they accept contracts c a and c b and banks choose γ a and γ b is equal to
Thus, we can define the ex ante indirect utility of a depositor who accepts the pair of contracts c a and c b as
Given the above, we now define the competitive equilibrium of the economy. (ii) For any contractĉ i , bank i invests optimally, i.e,
(iii) Banks in sector i offer contracts that maximize their profits.
(iv) Depositors accept the pair of contracts that offers them the highest utility.
The above notion of equilibrium requires that depositors withdraw their deposits from the banks optimally in all subgames that follow the acceptance of a contract. 9 Furthermore, the contracts that are offered have to satisfy incentive-compatibility, as the depositors understand that 6 Given that withdrawing at t = 1 is a strictly dominant action for impatient depositors, only patient depositors may wait until t = 2 to withdraw their deposits.
7 Given that the depositors invest only one unit of deposit in each sector, the profit of banks in sector i are independent of the contracts offered by banks in sector j = i.
8 Note that the transfer from the banks to the depositors is also a function of the returns of the assets z1 and z2. However, for notational simplicity we drop this dependence. 9 There exist equilibria in which all patient depositors withdraw their deposits at t = 1, regardless of the returns of the assets. Given that such bank runs are simply due to coordination failures, we only consider equilibria in which no such coordination failures arise. each bank would choose the portfolio that maximizes its expected profits. Finally, note that a contract c i is accepted in equilibrium only if it satisfies the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) condition of robustness to the introduction of additional profitable contracts. Next, we define a symmetric competitive equilibrium.
Definition 2. An equilibrium is symmetric if banks in both sectors offer identical demand deposit contracts and choose an identical level of diversification; i.e., if (c a1 , c a2 ) = (c b1 , c b2 ) and γ a = 1−γ b .
Throughout the rest of the paper, we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria. A full characterization of the equilibria is provided in Appendix A.
Diversification and Systemic Risk
In this section, we show that the equilibrium is not necessarily efficient. In particular, we show that under fairly broad conditions, the banks choose an overly diversified portfolio as far as social welfare is concerned. Hence, by forcing the banks to hold less diversified portfolios, a regulator can achieve an outcome that Pareto dominates the equilibrium allocation.
Before presenting our main results, however, it is helpful to compare the micro-founded model presented in the previous section with the reduced-form model of Section 2. The characterization provided in Appendix A shows that when the face value of the contracts offered by the banks
then there is a run on bank i if and only if x i < πc i1 , where x i = γ i z 1 + (1 − γ i )z 2 is the short-term return of the bank's portfolio. This is due to the fact that when the short-term return of bank i's portfolio is below πc i1 , the bank needs to liquidate its assets in order to meet its obligations to the impatient depositors. However, this implies that it would not be able to meet its obligations to the patient depositors at t = 2, inducing a bank run. Conversely, when x i > πc i1 , the bank does not need to liquidate its assets to pay the impatient depositors. Assumption R > (1 − π)c i2 then implies that the patient depositors have no incentive to withdraw at t = 1, ruling out a bank run.
Thus, the transfer from bank i to the depositors as a function of its short-term returns is given by
Furthermore, the expected profit of the bank is equal to
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) below depict the transfers to the depositors and bank i's profits in terms of i's short-term returns, respectively. threshold -equal to πc i1 -at which the payoffs to the depositors and the banks exhibit discontinuities. As already mentioned, such discontinuities are consequences of the fact that when the short-term returns on a bank's investment are small, withdrawal by the impatient depositors forces the bank to liquidate its assets prematurely. Anticipating this, the patient depositors would also decide to withdraw early, leading to a bank run. Hence, there exists a threshold under which the payoff to the bank and all depositors would be equal to zero and x i , respectively. However, unlike the reduced-form model, the run threshold and the payoff levels are endogenously determined in equilibrium, as they depend on the face value of the contract offered by the bank. Finally, note that the payoffs to the depositors and banks are not necessarily constant on both sides of the threshold; rather, T θ i and Π i are linearly increasing in x i below and above the threshold, respectively. This implies that unlike the reduced-form model, banks' profits are not necessarily decreasing in the default probabilities.
Diversification in Equilibrium
Our first result provides sufficient conditions under which the banks choose a fully diversified portfolio in equilibrium. Theorem 1. Suppose that there exists a constantz > 0 such that f (·) is non-decreasing over [0,z] . Then, there exist a constant R and functions κ(·) and κ(·) such that for all R > R and all κ(R) < k < κ(R) banks choose a fully diversified portfolio.
Thus, for high values of R and k (in addition to some mild technical conditions), the banks would invest equally in both assets, as a fully diversified portfolio maximizes their profits. The intuition behind the above result can be understood by drawing parallels with the reduced-form model of Section 2: a high enough rate of return R means that the banks find runs very costly, and hence, have an incentive to invest in such a way that the likelihood of a bank run is minimized. A high entry cost k, on the other hand, guarantees that the face value of the equilibrium contract and hence, the run threshold are small enough so that the banks can reduce the probability of a run via diversification. 10 In view of the banks' desire for diversification, financial innovations that enable them to engineer more diversified portfolios have a direct positive effect on the depositors' welfare. In particular, competition guarantees that banks make zero profits in equilibrium and all the surplus generated by such innovations are fully transferred to the depositors via contracts with better terms. 11
Thus, in line with the conventional wisdom, this result illustrates how financial instruments that enable inter-bank risk-sharing would positively affect the social welfare.
Finally, we remark that Theorem 1 merely provides a set of sufficient (but not necessary) conditions for full diversification in equilibrium. As we show in Subsection 4.4, banks may choose a fully diversified portfolio even if the conditions of the theorem are not satisfied.
Diversification Externality
Theorem 1 establishes conditions under which banks invest equally in both assets in equilibrium.
Our next theorem, which is the main result of the paper, shows that such an equilibrium is necessarily inefficient.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the equilibrium is inefficient.
Thus, even though banks choose to hold fully diversified portfolios, this outcome is not optimal from the social welfare point of view. Perfect correlation between the banks' short-term returns, which is a side effect of full diversification, increases systemic risk to the extent that it outweighs the benefits of diversification. The intuition behind this result is straightforward: with fully diversified portfolios, a negative return on only one of the assets may lead to a systemic crisis with simultaneous runs on both banks, whereas such an outcome would have been avoided with less diversification. Thus, effectively, by choosing more diversified (and hence, more similar) portfolios, the banks reduce the set of contingencies in which the depositors are (at least, partially) paid 10 If k is too small, the face value of the demand deposit contracts and hence, the threshold below which a run would occur would be large. In that case, banks may find it optimal to take excessive risk and hold a non-diversified portfolio. On the other hand, assumption k < κ(R) = R + µ guarantees that the banks find it optimal to enter. See Appendix A for the detailed characterization of the equilibrium.
11 If a bank in sector i can make positive profits by offering a contract ci = (ci1, ci2), another bank in the same sector can "undercut" it by offering a contract with slightly better terms, sayci = (ci1, ci2 + δ) for some arbitrary small δ > 0, and attract all the depositors. Note that the contract offered under this deviation remains incentive-compatible as the banks have a dominant action in all the subgames that follow the acceptance of the contract; they would choose a fully diversified portfolio regardless. However, such an incentive-compatible undercutting may not be possible if the banks do not have a dominant action in the investment subgames. If so, banks may make strictly positive profits in equilibrium, despite competition. For more on this, see, for example, Bennardo and Chiappori (2003) .
above the liquidation value.
In addition to the possibility of costly premature liquidations of the assets, the inefficiency established in Theorem 2 relies on three key ingredients. First and foremost, the result is driven by the presence of an overlap between the sets of assets the banks can invest in. Clearly, it is the presence of such overlaps which creates the "side effect" of correlated returns when banks decide to diversify: they cannot construct diversified portfolios without becoming more similar to one another. In the next subsection, we show that in the absence of such overlaps, in contrast to Theorem 2, diversification is always socially optimal.
The second key ingredient is the risk-aversion of the depositors. Had the depositors been risk-neutral, their expected utility function, V , would have been separable in transfers T θ a and T θ b from the banks, and hence, ceteris paribus, a change in the likelihood of simultaneous runs would have had no effect on social welfare. On the other hand, as the proof of the theorem shows, the more risk-averse the depositors are, the higher the social welfare gains of moving away from full diversification would be.
The inefficiency of equilibrium established in Theorem 2 also relies on the assumption that the investment decisions of the banks, i.e., γ a and γ b , are not contractable. This assumption implies that, once the contracts offered by the banks are accepted by the depositors, the banks do not internalize the adverse affect of diversification on the depositors when they choose their portfolios.
This externality thus leads to an inefficient equilibrium. If the banks had the power to commit to specific investment decisions, then the equilibrium and efficient levels of diversification would have coincided. 12 Finally, we remark that the above result holds despite the fact that there are no inter-bank externalities.
Theorem 2 has a number of implications. First, it suggests that a regulator can strictly increase the social welfare by restricting the set of portfolios the banks can choose from. Given that there is excessive diversification in equilibrium, forcing the banks to hold less diversified portfolios would be socially beneficial. Furthermore, our result suggests that the introduction of financial instruments that facilitate more diversification and inter-bank risk-sharing has non-trivial welfare implications. In particular, it points towards the possible existence of a "curse of financial engineering":
as banks use financial instruments to increase their profits and reduce their default probabilities, they may also, at the same time, increase the likelihood of a systemic crisis in which several financial institutions default simultaneously, with potentially severe social costs.
We remark that, even though Theorem 2 provides conditions under which there is too much diversification in equilibrium, the misalignment between the profit incentives of the banks and the depositors' welfare can also manifest itself through the existence of equilibria with too little diversification. In particular, as we show in Appendix A, when the long-term return R and the entry cost k are such that the contracts offered in equilibrium by the banks satisfy R < (1 − π)c i1 , the banks choose a non-diversified portfolio (as their expected profit functions are convex in the short-term returns of their portfolios). The fact that c i1 is large, then implies that the run threshold for an individual bank is relatively high, and thus depositors' welfare would increase with more diversification. This is due to the fact that more diversification decreases the probability of bank defaults.
Non-Overlapping Assets
Our next result shows that if the pairs of assets in which the banks can invest in do not overlap, full diversification would be an efficient equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the banks have access to non-overlapping pairs of assets. Then, under the assumptions of Theorem 1, they choose a fully diversified portfolio. Furthermore, this equilibrium is efficient.
Given that the banks cannot commit to specific investment decisions, they choose a fully diversified portfolio regardless of the presence (or lack thereof) of any overlap between the sets of assets available to them. Under either scenario, more diversification implies a lower default probability and hence, higher profits. Yet, with non-overlapping assets, full diversification no longer leads to correlated returns and hence, a higher likelihood of systemic crises. Thus, investment decisions that minimize the probability of individual defaults are also desirable from a social welfare point of view. This theorem also clarifies that the inefficiency identified in Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of the presence of overlapping assets and the induced correlation.
Exponential Returns
So far, our focus was on providing conditions under which the equilibrium portfolios chosen by the banks are overly diversified, while assuming that the short-term returns of the assets have a general distribution f (z). In the remainder of this section, we assume that the short-term returns are exponentially distributed with mean µ = 1/λ; that is, f (z) = λe −λz . This particular parametric assumption enables us to determine and compare the equilibrium and efficient levels of diversification as a function of the expected returns of the assets. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 4.
There exist constants λ andλ and functions κ(·) and κ(·) such that, (a) For all λ < λ and κ(λ) < k < κ(λ), the banks choose a fully diversified portfolio. If the pairs of assets available to the banks are identical, then this equilibrium is inefficient. On the other hand, with non-overlapping assets, the equilibrium is efficient.
(b) For all λ >λ and κ(λ) < k < κ(λ), the banks choose a non-diversified portfolio in equilibrium.
Furthermore, the no diversification equilibrium is efficient, regardless of the composition of the assets.
Part (a) simply states that for small values of λ -which equivalently corresponds to high expected short-term returns -the banks invest equally in both assets. This is not surprising in view of the fact that with high expected short-term returns, a fully diversified portfolio minimizes the probability of individual bank runs. Furthermore, it states that if both banks have to invest in the same pair of assets, a fully diversified equilibrium is never socially optimal. In other words, even though full diversification minimizes the risk of runs on individual banks, it actually increases the probability of simultaneous runs on both banks, increasing the aggregate risk faced by the depositors. Thus, this is the counterpart of Theorem 2 for the assets with exponential returns. The last statement of part (a) establishes that the inefficiency identified is indeed a consequence of the fact that banks invest in the same set of assets. As in Theorem 3, with non-overlapping sets of assets, the incentives of all parties would be fully aligned, as more diversification would no longer lead to higher inter-bank correlations. Taken together, part (a) of Proposition 4 also shows that the assumptions in the statement of Theorem 1 are not necessary for the existence of inefficient equilibria entailing full diversification.
Part (b) of Proposition 4, on the other hand, shows that for large enough values of λ -which correspond to low expected short-term returns -the banks choose a non-diversified portfolio.
This observation rests on the fact that, unlike part (a), a non-diversified portfolio is what min-
imizes the probability of a run on each of the banks. In particular, when expected short-term returns are sufficiently smaller than the run thresholds, the banks' optimal strategy entails maximum risk-taking. Finally, the last statement of part (b) states that the no diversification equilibrium is precisely the socially efficient portfolio choice, even if the banks invest in the same pair of assets.
Conclusions
The main insight suggested by this paper is that in the presence of liquidation costs, risk diversification by financial institutions may be socially inefficient. The paper presents a stylized model in which banks have an incentive to hold diversified portfolios, as diversification reduces the probability of bank runs. As a side effect, however, diversification also increases the correlation between the returns on banks' investments. Such correlations make systemic crises in which multiple banks fail simultaneously more likely. Our results show that it is indeed possible that the welfare loss due to joint failures of financial intermediaries outweigh the gains of diversification. In particular, we establish that in the presence of risk-averse depositors, large enough returns and entry costs guarantee that full diversification is inefficient.
Unlike the rest of the literature, we show that diversification may increase systemic risk even if there are no negative inter-bank externalities. Rather, the inefficiency in our model is due to the fact that banks do not internalize the adverse effects of diversification on the aggregate risk faced by their depositors: the diversification undertaken by the banks reduces the set of contingencies in which the depositors are paid above the liquidation value, effectively increasing the likelihood of a worst-case outcome for the depositors.
Our results have a number of implications. First, the potential externality that the banks' diversification decisions impose on the depositors suggests that, under certain conditions, a regulator may be able to increase social welfare by restricting the extent of diversification undertaken by individual financial institutions. This goal can be achieved by either imposing an outright limit on the set of assets that different financial institutions can invest in or introducing prohibitions against certain banking activities. Alternatively, a regulator can discourage diversification by, say, increasing the capital requirements for excessively diversified financial institutions. Such regulations would effectively decrease the correlation between the returns of different intermediaries as one of the main side effects of diversification, and as a result, reduce the likelihood of a systemic collapse of the financial system.
On a broader level, our analysis highlights that regulatory mechanisms that only focus on reducing each institution's risk in isolation may be insufficient for mitigating risks at a systemic level. This is due to the fact that reducing the risk in each institution's portfolio is not necessarily equivalent to reducing the risks to the banking system from an aggregate perspective. Therefore, an effective regulatory policy may need to take the correlations between different banks' portfolios into account.
Second and relatedly, our results suggest that the overall welfare implications of new financial instruments that facilitate risk-sharing and diversification may be non-trivial. In particular, even though the introduction of complex financial instruments may make individual institutions more stable, the system as a whole may become more prone to systemic crises. Thus, the well-known benefits of financial innovations (such as better risk-sharing, reducing transaction costs of investing, etc.), may be inseparable from the so called "curse of financial engineering."
We emphasize that even though we focused on an admittedly stylized micro-founded model, our conclusions do not hinge on its specific details or the simplifying assumptions we made (such as demand deposit contracts, competitive banking sectors, possibility of banks runs, etc.). Rather, as in the reduced-form model of Section 2, the key ingredient is the presence of non-convexities in the payments to the bankers and the depositors. Such non-convexities not only may create a misalignment of incentives between different parties, but may also lead to a non-smooth allocation of financial losses. As a final remark, note that even though the incentive to hold a diversified portfolio (and hence, minimize the risk of a default) is what led to correlated portfolios in our model, correlation may also arise for reasons other than diversification. For example, if the expected returns of different assets are heterogeneous, all banks may simply invest in the asset with the highest return. Alternatively, as noted by Rajan (2006) , if investment managers are compensated based on their relative performances, they may have an incentive to herd with one another and invest in the same set of assets in order to insure against underperforming their peers.
A Equilibrium Characterization
This appendix characterizes the equilibria of the subgames that follow the investment decisions of the banks. In particular, it characterizes the set of states in which patient depositors run on the banks, the transfers to the depositors, and the banks' expected profits as a function of the face value of the contracts and the short-term returns of the assets. Throughout, for notational simplicity, we drop the bank index i and denote the returns of its portfolio by x = γz 1 + (1 − γ)z 2 .
We restrict our attention to subgames in which banks offer demand deposit contracts c = (c 1 , c 2 ) such that c 1 ≤ c 2 . In light of the fact that offering more to depositors who withdraw at t = 1 is a strictly dominated strategy, this assumption is without loss of generality. Also note that as in the standard model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , there may exist equilibria in which all patient depositors withdraw their deposits at t = 1, regardless of the returns of the assets. Given that such bank runs are simply due to coordination failures, we only consider equilibria in which no such coordination failures arise.
Depending on the face value of the contracts, we consider two different cases. In particular, we study the equilibrium depending on whether c 1 is smaller or larger than R/(1 − π).
A.1
First, suppose that the face value of the contract offered by the bank (and accepted by the depositors) satisfies R < (1 − π)c 1 . We show that, in this case, there is a run on the bank if and only if the short-term return on its investment is less than c 1 − R.
If x > c 1 − R, then the bank does not need to liquidate its assets to pay the impatient depositors. Moreover, the bank would be able pay at least c 1 to the depositors who withdraw at t = 2.
Therefore, the patient depositors have no incentive to run on the bank at t = 1. In this case, the impatient and patient depositors get c 1 and min{c 2 , R+x−πc 1 1−π }, respectively. The payoff to the bank would then be equal to max{R + x − πc 1 − (1 − π)c 2 , 0}.
On the other hand, if x < πc 1 , the bank needs to liquidate its assets, as it cannot meet the demand at t = 1. Furthermore, x < πc 1 implies that R + x < c 1 , and hence, the bank would not be able to guarantee c 1 to depositors who withdraw at t = 2, inducing a run. In this case, all depositors get x and the bank gets nothing.
Finally, if πc 1 < x < c 1 − R, even though the bank does not need to liquidate its portfolio to pay the impatient depositors, there will still be a bank run. This is due to the fact that assuming that no other patient depositor withdraws at t = 1, an impatient depositor has a strictly dominant strategy to withdraw at t = 1 and get c 1 instead of R+x−πc 1 1−π < c 1 , inducing a run. In this case, the fact that x < c 1 implies that the bank gets nothing, whereas all depositors get x.
To summarize, the transfer from the bank to the depositors as a function of the face value of the contract and the realized returns of its portfolio is given by
The banks' expected profits, on the other hand, are
A straightforward consequence of the above characterization is that in the subgames in which bank i offers a contract with face value c i1 > R/(1 − π), it chooses a non-diversified portfolio. This is in light of the fact that the expected profit profit function Π i (c i , γ i ) is convex in x i , and hence, is maximized by choosing γ i ∈ {0, 1}.
A.2
Now suppose that R > (1 − π)c 1 . We show that in this case, there is a run on the bank if and only if the short-term return on the bank's investments satisfy x < πc 1 .
If x < πc 1 , then the bank needs to liquidate its assets, as it is incapable of meeting its commitment to the impatient depositors. Moreover, x < c 1 implies that following liquidation, it cannot meet its commitment to the patient depositors either. This induces a run on the bank, and as a consequence, the bank gets nothing whereas all depositors get x.
If on the other hand x > πc 1 , then the bank does not need to liquidate its assets to pay the impatient depositors. Moreover, the fact that R + x − πc 1 > R > (1 − π)c 1 implies that the patient depositors have no incentive to withdraw at t = 1, ruling out a bank run. Thus, the impatient depositors get the face value of their contracts, whereas the patient depositors get min{c 2 ,
In this case, the bank gets max{R + x − πc 1 − (1 − π)c 2 , 0}.
To summarize, transfers to the depositors can be expressed as
The payoff to the banks, on the other hand, is equal to
where 1 denotes the indicator function. Note that unlike the previous case, Π i (c i , γ i ) is not necessarily convex in x i anymore. Furthermore, if (1 − π)c i2 < R, then it exhibits a discontinuity at
B Planner's Problem
This appendix characterizes the problem of a social planner who intends to maximize social welfare by choosing the extent of diversification in banks' investments (i.e., γ a and γ b ), subject to the incentive compatibility constraints of the banks who offer contracts that maximize their profits.
The social welfare is the sum of banks' profits and the expected utility of the depositors; that is,
where c a and c b are the face value of the contracts offered by the banks under competition. We have the following lemma: Lemma 1. Given γ i , γ j and c j , the demand deposit contract c i is offered by bank i only if it solves the problem
Furthermore, the constraint binds at the optimal solution.
Proof:
Suppose that c i = (c i1 , c i2 ) is a contract that is offered by a bank in sector i. Clearly, the bank can always guarantee itself zero profits by deciding not to enter at all. Therefore, c i is offered in equilibrium only if Π i (c i , γ i ) ≥ k, implying that the contract must satisfy constraint (5). Now, suppose that there exists another
while satisfying constraint (5). Due to the continuity of V , there exists a small enough δ > 0 such
where the second inequality is a consequence of the fact that Π i (c i , γ i ) is decreasing in c i1 for all γ i . Thus, another bank can make strictly positive profits by offeringc i . Such a deviation would undercut the bank that had offered c i and hence, would attract all the depositors. This contradicts the assumption that c i was offered in equilibrium.
We next show that constraint (5) binds at the optimal solution. Suppose, that it does not bind for some solution c i ; that is, Π i (c i , γ i ) > k. Then, there exists a small enough δ such that the contract
which is a contraction.
The above lemma shows that once the planner chooses γ a and γ b , banks in sector i offer a contract c i in order to maximize the expected utility of the depositors, subject to making zero profits.
Thus, the planner's problem reduces to choosing γ a and γ b in order to maximize V (c a , c b , γ a , γ b ) subject to the constraint that c i solves problem (4).
C Proofs C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We first state and prove a simple lemma.
) is continuous and strictly decreasing in c i1 and c i2 .
Proof:
The equilibrium characterization provided in Appendix A shows that Π i (c i , γ i ) is continuous in c i2 and γ i . This is a consequence of the assumption that the distribution function of the returns has a well-defined density with full support over positive reals. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that the expected profit function is continuous in c i1 in both cases A.1 and A.2. Therefore, to establish continuity in c i1 , it is sufficient to show that
Thus, Π i (c i , γ i ) is continuous in all arguments. Berge's Maximum Theorem then guarantees that
is continuous in c i . In order to prove monotonicity, note that, keeping γ i fixed, the profits of bank i are strictly decreasing in c i1 . Therefore, ifc i = (c i1 − δ, c i2 ) for some δ > 0, then
where the first inequality is a consequence of the fact that, by definition, γ * i (c i ) maximizes the profits of bank i if it offers contractc i to the depositors. A similar argument implies that Π i (c i , γ * i (c i )) is strictly decreasing in c i2 .
Proof of Theorem 1:
Given the symmetry between the two assets, we restrict our attention to the case that γ i ∈ [0, 1/2] and show that bank i's profit is maximized at γ i = 1/2 which corresponds to a fully diversified portfolio.
Fix a constant 0 <c <z/(2π) and suppose that κ(R) < k < κ(R), where
Assumption k < R + µ ensures that the entry cost is not too high for the banks to enter in equilibrium. Otherwise, bank i would make negative expected profits even if it offers c i = (0, 0) to the depositors. On the other hand, assumption k > κ(R) ensures that as long as R > (1 − π)c, bank i would never offer a contract in which c i2 >c. Note that given the characterization in Appendix A, if the bank offers c i = (0,c), its expected payoffs following entry would satisfy
which is strictly smaller than the entry cost k. Thus, given the monotonicity of Π i (c i , γ * i (c i )) in c i1 and c i2 established in Lemma 2, the bank would only offer contracts in which c i1 ≤ c i2 <c.
Next, note that as long as R > (1 − π)c, bank i's expected profit as a function of the face value of the contract c i and its investment decision γ i is given by (2). Hence, the bank chooses γ i in order to maximize
The derivative of the above expression with respect to γ i is equal to
It is easy to verify that the first term on the right-hand side is non-positive over [0, 1/2], whereas the second term is equal to zero at γ = 1/2. Furthermore, the integral in the second term is strictly positive over [0, 1/2). This can be verified by considering the derivative
which is negative given the assumption that f (·) is positive over [0,z] .
Therefore, as long as
then ∂Π i /∂γ i is non-negative for all γ i ∈ [0, 1/2), implying that the bank's profits are maximized by choosing a fully diversified portfolio. Hence, for R > R = max{R, (1 − π)c} and κ(R) < k < R + µ, the equilibrium entails full diversification.
The proof is complete once we verify thatR is finite. In particular, it is sufficient to show that the ratio in (8) is finite as γ i → 1/2, as the numerator and the denominator are, respectively, finite and non-zero for all other values of γ i ∈ [0, 1/2). To this end, we apply L'Hopital's rule. The expression in (6) immediately implies that the derivative of h i (γ i ) in the denominator with respect to γ i evaluated at 1/2 is non-zero. Hence,R is finite, completing the proof.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 2
In order to establish the inefficiency of equilibrium, it is sufficient to show that the social planner can increase welfare by forcing the banks to hold less diversified portfolios than what they choose in equilibrium. To this end, we show that ∂W/∂γ a is strictly negative at γ a = γ b = 1/2, where
is the social welfare function defined in (3).
By Lemma 1, the expected profit of each bank after entry is exactly equal to the entry cost k, regardless of the values of γ a and γ b . Hence, it is sufficient to study the change in the depositors' expected utility,
Furthermore, Lemma 1 also shows that c i solves problem (4). Thus, the first-order conditions imply
where ζ i is a Lagrange multiplier. Therefore,
On the other hand, the fact that
Replacing the above equalities in (9) leads to
Since Π a (c a , γ a ) is a symmetric and differentiable function of γ a around 1/2, its derivative at that point has to be equal to zero. Hence, the proof is complete once we show that lim γa→ 1 2 ∂ V /∂γ a is strictly negative. In light of the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium banks offer identical contracts, without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to the case that c a = c b = (c 1 , c 2 ).
Furthermore, we assume that γ a ≤ 1/2 ≤ γ b .
Recall that under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the face value of the contracts offered in equilibrium satisfy c i1 , c i2 ≤ R/(1 − π). Therefore, by the characterization provided in Appendix A, the expected utility of the impatient depositors when both banks offer contract c = (c 1 , c 2 ) and choose diversification levels γ a and γ b is equal to
where
is the expected utility of the impatient depositors. Expanding the terms, we obtain
Differentiating the above with respect to γ a implies
Due to symmetry, the first term on the right-hand side is equal to zero. The second term, on the other hand, is strictly negative as long as u(·) is strictly concave. Thus, by forcing bank a away from full diversification, the social planner can strictly increase the expected utility of the impatient depositors. A similar argument implies lim γa,
is the expected utility of the patient depositors. Thus, the social planner can increase the expected welfare of the depositors by forcing banks away from full diversification, establishing that the full diversification equilibrium is inefficient.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Once the contracts are accepted by the depositors, the optimal level of diversification for each bank is independent of the overlap between the sets of assets available to each one of them. Therefore, by Theorem 1, the banks would choose a fully diversified portfolio. In the rest of the proof, we show that full diversification is indeed efficient.
In order to prove the efficiency of equilibrium in the presence of non-overlapping assets, it is sufficient to show that ∂W n /∂γ a is non-negative for γ a ∈ (0, 1/2), where W n (γ a , γ b ) is the social welfare function when the assets are non-overlapping and is equal to the sum of the banks' profits and the expected utility of the depositors. 13 In particular, , c b , γ a , γ b ) is the ex ante expected utility of the depositors when the banks offer contracts with face values c a and c b and choose diversification levels γ a and γ b . As in the proof of Theorem 2, we have
By Theorem 1, we know that ∂Π a /∂γ a is non-negative for γ a ∈ (0, 1/2). Given that the Lagrange multiplier ζ a is also non-negative, it is sufficient to show that V n is non-decreasing in γ a over (0, 1/2). By the characterization in Appendix A,
where x i = γ i z i 1 + (1 − γ i )z i 2 denotes the short-term return of bank i's portfolio and (z i 1 , z i 2 ) are the short-term returns on the assets available to i. Note that,
where h a (·) is defined in (7). Furthermore,
Given that the first term on the right-hand side of the above equality is non-negative for γ a ∈ (0, 1/2), we obtain
Similarly,
Differentiating (11) with respect to γ a and using (12)- (15) lead to
Given the fact that c a2 ≥ c a1 , we obtain
for some positive constant A. Finally, as established in the proof of Theorem 1, h a (γ a ) ≥ 0 for all γ a ∈ (0, 1/2), hence, implying that V n is maximized at γ a = 1/2. This completes the proof.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We first state two simple lemmas, which we will later use in the proof of part (b). 
Proof of Proposition 4:
To prove part (a), consider a sequence of economies characterized by {λ r , k r } r∈N such that
where κ(λ) = R + λ −1 and κ(λ) = κ(λ) −
(1−π)R 1−2π/3 . As in the proof of Theorem 1, condition (17) guarantees that banks enter in equilibrium and that they never offer a contract in which c i2 > R 1−2π/3 . Therefore, bank i's expected profit as a function of the face value of the contract c i and its investment decision γ i is given by (2).
The derivative of bank i's objective function in a subgame in which it offers contract c i = (c i1 , c i2 ) to depositors satisfies
Straightforward algebraic manipulations imply
which is positive for γ i ∈ (0, 1/2) and negative for γ i ∈ (1/2, 1). Therefore, for large enough values of r, and hence, small enough values of λ, the expected profit of the bank is maximized at γ * i (c i ) = 1/2 in all subgames. Thus, under the conditions of part (a), banks invest equally in both assets.
The proof of the second statement of part (a) is parallel to the proof of Theorem 2, which shows that the social planner never chooses a fully diversified portfolio. Thus, under the conditions of the proposition, a regulator can improve the welfare of the depositors by forcing banks to choose a less diversified portfolio.
Finally, proving that full diversification is efficient with non-overlapping pairs of assets follows a logic parallel to that of the proof of Theorem 3. In particular, recall that as established in the proof of Theorem 3, the full diversification equilibrium is efficient if ∂ V /∂γ a is positive for all γ a ∈ (0, 1/2). Furthermore, by (16), it is sufficient to show that h a (γ a ) = πc a1 γa 0 (z − πc a1 )f (z)f πc a1 − γ a z 1 − γ a dz > 0.
Given that the returns are exponentially distributed, we have
which is positive for γ a < 1/2. Therefore, for large enough values of r, i.e., small enough λ, the social welfare is maximized with fully diversified portfolios, completing the proof.
To prove part (b), consider a sequence of economies characterized by {λ r , k r } n∈N such that ∂Π i ∂γ i = πc i1 (R − (1 − π)c i2 ) (1 − γ i )(2γ i − 1) , which is negative for γ i ∈ (0, 1/2) and positive for γ i ∈ (0, 1/2). Therefore, for large enough values of r, and hence, large enough values of λ, the expected profit of the bank is maximized at γ * i (c i ) = 0 in all subgames -corresponding to a non-diversified portfolio. Thus, in equilibrium, banks do not diversify at all.
In order to prove that the no diversification equilibrium is indeed efficient, note that in view of (10) and the fact that 
In particular, after multiplying both sides of (18) by λ −1 r exp λrπc 1 1−γa , Lemma 4 implies that the limits of the first two terms on the right-hand side are equal to zero. On the other hand, Lemma 3 implies that the limit of the third term is equal to zero, whereas the last two terms have finite limits. Now, it is easy to verify that the right-hand side of (19) is negative for γ a ∈ (0, 1/2). Similarly, we can show that lim r→∞ ∂ V ∂γa < 0 for γ a ∈ (0, 1/2). Therefore, we conclude that for large values of r, and consequently large values of λ, a non-diversified portfolio is efficient.
Finally, to complete the proof of part (b), we need to show that for large values of λ, nondiversified portfolios maximize social welfare even when banks invest in non-overlapping pairs of assets. Recall from the proof of Theorem 3 that ∂W n ∂γ a = ∂ V n ∂γ a + ζ a ∂Π a ∂γ a .
Given that ∂Π a /∂γ a is negative for large enough values of λ, it is sufficient to show lim r→∞ 1 λ r e λr πc 1 1−γa ∂ V n ∂γ a < 0.
Differentiating (11) with respect to γ a , we obtain ∂ V n ∂γ a = πu(c a1 + c b1 ) + (1 − π)u(c a2 + c b2 ) · P(x b > πc b1 ) · ∂ ∂γ a P(x a > πc a1 )
Recall from (12) that ∂ ∂γ a P(x a > πc a1 ) = h a (γ a ) (1 − γ a ) 2 , and from (13) 
The right-hand side of the above expression is negative for γ a ∈ (0, 1/2). Hence, for large enough values of λ, the welfare is maximized if the banks' portfolios are not diversified, completing the proof.
